This article examines the theology of Charles Journet in light of the Second Vatican Council's teaching on sacerdotal and episcopal character. Journet's theology is placed in dialogue with the teaching of the Council and subsequent questions that have resulted from it, from three overlapping perspectives. First, Journet's theology of Orders, especially as articulated in his celebrated work The Church of the Word Incarnate, is presented. Second, in light of his theology of Orders, the content of Cardinal Journet's written submission on (...) the draft of Presbyterorum Ordinis during the final session of the Council is brought to light. Finally, Journet's own reflections on Lumen Gentium are examined for the sake of further pinpointing his own position on sacerdotal character in relation to the teaching of the Council. This article seeks to highlight the value that Journet's thought has in its own right for probing contemporary theological questions and, additionally, to draw attention to his role and presence at the final session of the Second Vatican Council. Journet's presence and role at the Council have, heretofore, been largely untreated by Anglo-American theologians. (shrink)

This article considers Aquinas' doctrine of predestination as an eternal reality in God in light of its temporal realization in time by the incarnation of the eternal Son. In particular, Aquinas' repeated recourse to the ratio of the divine goodness as the motive of predestination is documented in conjunction with his teaching on the fittingness of the incarnation. In this light, the relation of the natural sonship of Christ to the grace of adoption is developed by Aquinas as the temporal (...) realization of the eternal reality of predestination in God. (shrink)

This volume brings together eleven essays that address a range of issues extending from broader questions of social justice to the sexual intimacy that bears the mark of our fleshly existence. Collectively, these essays extend the reach of Paul Ricoeur’s early to late works by taking up some of the major social, political and religious challenges facing us in a postmodern, ultrapluralistic world.

Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic (...) dichotomies. Formerly opposed features from previous polar alternatives become merged into a novel unifying synthesis, an unambiguous description of which demands redefinition of old terms or/and the invention of new terminology. The present analysis and interpretation are backed by statements from the early papers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God by Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P.Roger W. NuttThe Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God. By Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 270. $99.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-968858-6.The centrality that Christ’s death by crucifixion has in Christian life, doctrine, and culture is scarcely in need of elaboration. Nevertheless, the relation between (...) the will of the Father and the violent and humiliating manner of Christ’s death raises substantive questions concerning the internal coherence of Christian claims about the love, goodness, and justice of God. In The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God, Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., confronts these questions, openly acknowledging their difficulty and seriousness, and provides a philosophically precise and theologically fresh response to the challenges they pose to the credibility of the Christian message.The ten chapters of The Father’s Will are divided into tripartite units that progress in logical sequence from “philosophical prolegomena” (part 1) to “New Testament evidence” (part 2), culminating with a “theological [End Page 317] evaluation” (part 3). The question at the heart of the book is how to reconcile the Christian doctrine that God and evil are incompatible with the theology of the Cross, which seems to require that God’s will is implicated in the evil actions that bring about Christ’s death.The first five chapters (part 1) provide a philosophical analysis of intention (chap. 1), value and obligation (chap. 2), double-effect reasoning (chap. 3), the ethical problems associated with self-sacrifice (chap. 4), and God’s will in relation to the crucifixion (chap. 5). Drawing on his analysis of intention and employing the principle of double effect, Lombardo establishes that it is not necessary to conclude that God wills the evils that are attendant on Christ’s death. “Actions performed by rational intentions,” Lombardo explains, “are not only intended; they are also willed. Rational intending implies rational choice, and rational choice is an act of the will” (32). This understanding of intention and willing, as distinguishable from intentional action, provides a foundation upon which the moral goodness of actions can be determined. “For an action to be good,” Lombardo argues, “it must do more than simply advance our natural inclinations: it must also avoid frustrating them. Only actions that both advance our natural inclinations and avoid frustrating them are morally good” (49). When moral actions have good effects and nonintended bad effects that do not outweigh the good effects—as in cases of self-defense or the use of medicine and medical procedures—these complex actions retain their moral goodness, notwithstanding the bad effects. The reason for this is that the bad effects are not included in the agent’s intention. Lombardo presents the crucifixion of Christ as one of these complex cases in which the bad effects can be separated from the agent’s intention. Chapter 3 explores the reasoning associated with the principle of double effect to clarify how actions implicated in bad or evil effects can be judged to be morally good. Lombardo is hesitant to identify double effect as an isolated principle that is applicable within unique circumstantial cases. Rather, he presents double effect as “merely an algorithm for applying basic concepts to morally ambiguous actions” (72). For example, in addition to affirming that the intended effects of the action are consistent with our natural inclinations, in cases of double-effect reasoning “the action’s positive, intended effects [must] outweigh the action’s negative, nonintended effects” (73). This material, in turn, connects logically with the conclusion of chapter 4 on the ethics of self-sacrifice: “double effect reasoning shows that it can be acceptable, and even heroic, to cause our own death non-intentionally for the sake of some greater good” (79). The last chapter in part 1 applies these distinctions to the problem of God’s will and the moral evil involved in Christ’s crucifixion. Here, the basic dilemma that the book addresses is succinctly restated: “Being all good, God never wants... (shrink)

Traditional scientific views of the conscious self and world we live in are challenged by an unprecedented outburst of emerging new paradigms, theories of consciousness, perceptions of reality, new sciences, new philosophies, epistemologies, and a host of other transformative approaches. This still expanding outburst can be traced, on both logical and chronologic grounds, not to chaos theory, ecology, the new physics, or dozens of other currently ascribed sources, but rather to the cognitive (consciousness) revolution that immediately preceded. These new approaches (...) all share one key feature in common, namely, they all depend, directly or indirectly, upon a refutation and successful overthrow of the long dominant materialist paradigm. This is what was required to shift consciousness from an acausal or "eliminable" status to a functionally indispensable role. Traditional "bottom‐up" micro‐determinism had to be supplemented by a reciprocal, "top‐down" control exerted by mental emergents over lower‐level components. This does not dispose of behaviorism or reductionism, as methodology, but simply incorporates these within a more comprehensive explanatory framework. With the long reign of materialist constraints finally broken, other antireductive views have proliferated but with little regard for what the new paradigm allows. (shrink)

Israel Kirzner is to be credited for clarifying and developing the theory of capital and interest set out by Ludwig von Mises and for articulating and defending the pure time preference theory of interest. A revisiting of Mises and his critics suggests that the pure time preference theory is best formulated in terms of economic actions and then applied to the anticipated consequences of those actions. Differences between the Misesian and Knightian reckonings of time preference are to be understood in (...) terms of the contrasting conceptions of a zero time preference. Parallels between the time preference theory of interest and a leisure preference theory of wages are explored. Austrian economics is deemed healthy despite lingering puzzles about its theories of interest and wages.On doit au Professeur Kirzner la clarification et le développement de la théorie du capital et de l’intérêt dans la lignée de Ludwig von Mises et l’articulation et la défense de la théorie de l’intérêt comme étant la préférence pure pour le temps. Une relecture des travaux de Mises et de ses critiques suggère qu la théorie de la préférence pure pour le temps est mieux formulée en termes d’actions économiques et ensuite appliquée aux conséquences anticipées de ces mêmes actions. Les différences entre les acceptions Misessiennes et Knigtienne de la préférence pour le temps doivent être comprises en termes de conceptions différentes d’une préférence nulle pour le temps. Les rapprochements entre la théorie de l’intérêt comme préférence pour le temps et la théorie des salaires comme préférence pour les loisirs sont explorés. L’économie autrichienne est jugée saine en dépit des énigmes persistantes qui entourent ses théories de l’intérêt et des salaires. (shrink)

I dispute the claim that the disclosure of the life-world by phenomenology is an accomplishment of 'permanent' significance. By briefly reviewing the meaning of the "world" and "life-world" in the writings of Husserl, Gurwitsch, Schutz-Luckmann, Ortega, Heidegger, Jonas, Straus, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, I show that they all treat the world, or rather the affairs which comprise it, as passively present whether viewed as a mental acquisition or as the "Other." But the meaning of the world-as that wherein are met physical (...) demands upon us which must be satisfied if we are to continue living-cannot be considered either as a mental acquisition or as something that is "other" and over against us. A living being as living cannot fail to attend to the agency of the affairs of which the life-world consists, as well as one's own exploring and coping actions. If we are to really speak of life, then we must acknowledge the mutual and reciprocal activities of living beings and world. (shrink)

The effort involved in playing sports calls for a hermeneutical reflection on the power that we have to move our bodies. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s phenomenology of the lived body and his later ontology of the flesh, I explore how athletic displays of agility, strength, and speed within the theater of sporting competitions exemplify the way that the effort made by athletes attests to their will and desire to succeed. The agonistic spirit of the Greek Olympics is evident in sporting (...) events where competitors or teams strive against one another. At the same time, the players’ willingness to enter the field of play has a counterpart in real-life situations over which we cannot exert complete control. The contingencies of the game in which the players are caught up are a model of the absence of aseity that is a mark of all human existence. By setting the playing field off from the concerns of everyday life, the game places this feature of the human condition on stage. The players’ physical exertion is the sign of a form of consent that sets the will, desire, and effort to exist against the wish for absolute freedom. Sporting competitions are therefore a theater for dramatizing the misery and grandeur of a specifically human freedom. (shrink)